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The BRIDGES project has been funded by the UK Department of Trade 
and Industry to develop a Grid infrastructure suitable for the research 
activities involved in the Wellcome Trust funded Cardiovascular 
Functional Genomics (CFG) project. The CFG project is investigating 
possible genetic causes of hypertension. Key requirements on this 
infrastructure are to link various distributed biomedical data sources 
together; to transparently address the different security requirements 
associated with those data resources, and develop tools for analysing and 
exploring those data sets. In this paper we discuss the security solutions 
that the BRIDGES team is pursuing through the first practical exploration 
of Global Grid Forum Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) 
AuthZ interface to an authorisation infrastructure (PERMIS) using 




1. BRIDGES Background 
Hypertension affects a quarter of the adult 
population in western societies and is the 
major cause of cardiovascular mortalities. It 
is believed that hypertension is caused by a 
combination of factors including both 
genetic and environmental influences. The 
CFG project [1] is investigating the causes 
of hypertension and involves five UK and 
one Dutch site. It is pursuing a strategy 
combining studies on rodent models of 
disease with studies of patients and 
population DNA collections. The project is a 
prime example of the large-scale 
computational problems associated with 
modern biology, with requirements to 
combine vast arrays of heterogeneous 
information about three species, human, 
mouse and rat.  Currently however, many of 
the activities that the CFG scientists 
undertake in performing their research are 
done in a time consuming and largely non-
automated manner often requiring 
navigation to many different data resources, 
web sites and following multiple links to 
potentially relevant information. Similarly, 
in their pursuit of novel genes and 
understanding their associated function, the 
scientists often require access to large scale 
compute facilities to analyse their data sets, 
e.g. in performing large scale sequence 
comparisons or cross-correlations between 
large biological data sources. 
 
The Biomedical Research Informatics 
Delivered by Grid Enabled Services 
(BRIDGES) project [2] has been funded by 
the UK Department of Trade and Industry to 
directly address the needs of the CFG 
scientists and provide a thorough 
investigation of relevant technologies for 
this purpose. Specifically, BRIDGES will 
investigate the application of Open Grid 
Services Architecture – Data Access and 
Integration (OGSA-DAI) [3] and IBM’s 
Information Integrator product [4] to deal 
with federation of distributed biomedical 
data.  
A key requirement of the scientist and hence 
focus of the BRIDGES work is security. 
Broadly speaking, the CFG scientific data 
can be classified dependent upon its security 
characteristics into three groups: public data 
(with no/minimal security, e.g. publicly 
curated genomic databases); shared data 
(belonging to the CFG scientists/consortia, 
e.g. shared research data sets); private data 
(belonging to given CFG sites and 
unavailable to anyone else, e.g. personal 
medical records). 
 
2. Security Considerations 
The Grid infrastructure to be deployed by 
BRIDGES should address all of the security 
concerns and interlinking of the different 
data sets in as transparent, and user friendly 
a manner as possible. It is widely recognised 
that the existing security solutions adopted by 
the Grid community have scope for 
improvement [5]. Currently for example, the 
UK e-Science community in establishing the 
Level-2 Grid has focused largely on PKI [6] 
based authentication mechanisms for security 
using X.509 [7] certificates issued by RAL. 
Authentication as the establishment and 
propagation of a user’s identity in a given 
system is a useful starting point for security, 
but should ideally be augmented with, at a 
minimum, authorisation capabilities 
concerned with controlling access to services 
based upon specific policies. There are 
numerous technologies which claim to provide 
levels of authorisation in the context of the 
Grid including CAS [8], Akenti [9], VOMS 
[10], VOM [11] and PERMIS [12].   
 
Given that BRIDGES has focused upon 
Globus toolkit version 3 (GT3) [13] as the 
basis for implementation of the initial family 
of Grid services accessing and using the 
different data sets, it is important that 
authorisation capabilities were made available 
through this technology. The Global Grid 
Forum Security Authorisation working group 
have developed specifications of generic 
Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) 
[13] APIs through which authorisation 
infrastructures can be accessed and used. This 
API specification was prototyped in the 
PERMIS and Globus Toolkit (version 3.3) 
toolkits – thus permitting SAML authorisation 
callouts from Grid services to authorisation 
infrastructures to be realised. This work thus 
represents the first exploration of the SAML 




The PERMIS software realises a Role Based 
Access Control (RBAC) authorisation 
infrastructure. It offers a standards-based Java 
API that allows developers of resource 
gateways (gatekeepers) to enquire if a 
particular access to a resource should be 
allowed. PERMIS RBAC uses XML based 
policies defining rules, specifying which 
access control decisions are to be made for 
given VO resources. These rules include: 
• definitions of subjects that can be assigned 
roles 
• definitions of Sources of Authority 
(SOAs) - trusted to assign roles to subjects 
• definitions of roles and their hierarchical 
relationships 
• definitions of what roles can be assigned 
to which subjects 
• definitions of target resources, and the 
actions that can be applied to them 
• definitions of which roles are allowed to 
perform which actions on which targets 
• the conditions under which access can be 
granted to roles. 
 
Roles are assigned to subjects by issuing them 
with X.509 Attribute Certificate(s). A 
graphical tool called the Privilege Allocator 
(PA) has been developed to support this 
process. Once policies are developed they are 
signed and stored in an LDAP repository. 
 
2.2 SAML AuthZ Specification 
The SAML specification defines a number of 
elements for making assertions and queries 
regarding authentication, authorization 
decisions and attributes The SAML AuthZ 
specification defines a message exchange 
between a policy enforcement point (PEP) and 
a policy decision point (PDP) consisting of an 
AuthorizationDecisionQuery flowing from the 
PEP to the PDP, with an assertion returned 
containing some number of 
AuthorizationDecisionStatements 
 
The AuthorizationDecisionQuery itself 
consists of 
• A Subject element containing a 
NameIdentifier specifying the initiator 
identity 
• A Resource element specifying the 
resource to which the request to be 
authorized is being made. 
• One or more Action elements 
specifying the actions being requested 
on the resources 
 
The GGF SAML profile specifies a 
SimpleAuthorizationDecisionStatement 
(essentially a granted/denied Boolean) and an 
ExtendedAuthorizationDecisionQuery that 
allows the PEP to specify whether the simple 
or full authorization decision is to be returned. 
 
3. System Design and Initial 
Experiences 
 
Figure 1 provides an overview of the system 
used to explore the SAML AuthZ interface in 
Bridges. The GT3-PERMIS extensions 
realising the GGF SAML AuthZ profile allows 
for authorisation at portal access and 
subsequent Grid service invocations to be 
supported. The portal is personalised to CFG 
scientists based on the policies that have been 
defined for them, i.e. their role, targets etc. 
These policies are accessed when users log-in. 
Thus scientists are restricted to seeing and 
using services that are appropriate based on 
their roles. 
 
A typical scenario that the infrastructure 
supports is: 
• The user requests access to the CFG 
portal; 
• The access request results in a SAML 
query being raised to ensure that this user 
is authorised to access the portal (by 
ensuring an appropriate policy is available 
in the secure LDAP repository); 
• If successful (the user is authorised), the 
portal is configured/personalised to 
display the services that are associated 
with that user; 
• At this point, the user can invoke various 
services (they are entitled to use) – one of 
these in a syntenic relation visualisation 
service (SyntenyVista).  
• Upon launching SyntenyVista (using 
WebStart technologies) the users can use 
data available in the repository (which 
itself provides an OGSA-DAI front end 
and exploits IBM Information Integator to 
integrate and where possible federate 
various remote  public data resources); 
• The user may then visually explore 
genomic data sets and potentially export 
these onto the high throughput computing 
resources ScotGrid for sequence similarity 
checking (BLAST) against other query 
sequences.  
 
In the current implementation the usage of 
SyntenyVista offers direct visualisation of data 
sets available via the repository (from ensembl 
[15]). It is planned however that the user is 
restricted to seeing and visualising the data 
sets that they are entitled to see based upon 
their role within the CFG virtual organisation 
(VO), this applies also to the usage/invocation 
of GT3 based Blast services, i.e. that they will 
be restricted to those users and those data sets 
that meet appropriate security restrictions. 
 
Work is on-going to address this issue with 
initial thoughts that this will be realised 
through mapping of the user role within the 
CFG VO (as extracted from the secure policy 
database) against specifically established user 
views of data sets available via the DB2 data 
repository. However one issue that has been 
encountered with the SAML AuthZ profile is 
the lack of granularity in how users might 
invoke actions. For example, different actions 
may or may not be allowed depending upon 
the data that they wish to access and 
potentially change. The SAML AuthZ profile 
does not currently allow actions to be 
distinguished based upon the parameters that 
might be associated with them. As a result, the 
GT3 based BLAST service cannot be 
restricted to BLAST those data sets that are 
appropriate to the invoker. Instead, the SAML 
AuthZ specification supports either a 
SecureGrid BLAST service or a non-secure 
BLAST service. Thus when the portal is 
personalised per user/role, it is not possible to 
distinguish the usage of individual operations, 
e.g. to allow arbitrary invocations of actions 
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Figure 1: System Design and Usage Scenario 
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